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Abstract 
 
Pharmaceuticals are promoted worldwide, and thus international marketing and branding strategies are 
important. When launching drugs onto the market, there are two choices; launching the drugs directly, or 
forming marketing alliances to utilize a partner firm’s promotional activities. This paper examines the choice 
of international entry mode by Japanese pharmaceutical firms. Estimation results indicate that firms with 
smaller product portfolios prefer alliances when intellectual property right protection (IPP) is moderately 
strong. Because licensed-out and imitation products may cannibalize sales of a firm’s own products, when 
these risks are low, alliances are chosen. We also find that firms with larger portfolios and higher productivity 
prefer direct launches of high-quality products, implying that marketing activities tend to be internalized 
when the originator firm’s contribution to raising profits becomes more important than that of the partner firm, 
as the residual rights theory suggests.   
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1  Introduction 
 
Pharmaceutical companies supply both domestic and foreign markets, so pharmaceutical products 
are promoted worldwide. It is often observed that firms supplying foreign markets enter into 
alliances. An originator firm and a (potential) rival firm sign a contract for marketing and 
promotion. The rival firm supplies the originator firm’s drug under its name, or the firms jointly 
engage in local clinical trial activities and sell the product together. For example, an HMG-CoA 
reductase inhibitor developed by Novartis is sold under the name “Lescol” in Canada and the US. 
In Japan, Novartis and Mitsubishi–Tanabe Pharma jointly undertook clinical trials and sold it 
under the name of “Lochol.” This type of alliance practice has been observed in other industries, 
such as the automotive and electronics industries.1 In recent years, there has been concern about  
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the remarkable surge in the number of international strategic alliances in the global economy and 
the consequences of such cross-border activities (OECD, 2001). 
Alliances can be classified into two types: technology-oriented and market-oriented (Roth01, 
2001). While technology-oriented alliances include R&D joint ventures and technology transfer 
licensing, the activities we focus on here are market-oriented alliances, including regulatory 
management, marketing, and sales. Pharmaceutical products are advertised and promoted 
extensively, so marketing and branding strategies are important to raise revenue (Rizzo, 1999). If 
foreign firms face difficulties establishing their brand names or desire to take advantage of local 
brand names and distribution channels, while local firms wish to obtain new goods to enrich their 
product portfolios, the firms form market-oriented alliances to utilize their complementary assets. 
Then, drug supply patterns can be affected significantly by alliance behavior. Because improving 
medicinal access is a fundamental priority for people, if entry mode choice matters for supply 
pattern, it is important to detect impediments and facilitators for international entry modes.  
This paper addresses the question of what kinds of factors are significant for the choice 
between market-oriented alliances (using other firms’ brand names and marketing activities) and 
direct launches (supplying products by their own or through an independent wholesaler) using 
Japanese pharmaceutical company data. Pharmaceutical entry patterns are an important issue in the 
literature on the pharmaceutical industry (Scott Morton, 1999; Danzon,Wang and Wang, 
2005; Lanjouw, 2005; Kyle, 2006,2007). We investigate not only entry patterns, but also entry 
mode choice in detail to provide additional insights into pharmaceutical firm entry strategies. 
Exploiting detailed drug-level data allows us to discover how decisions on internalization of 
marketing and branding activities are made not only among firms, but also across drugs and 
markets. Because entry mode choice is made on product and market base, our approach matches 
the real unit and the theory of internalization (for example, Ethier and Markusen, 1996). In this 
study, we empirically examine the modes of drug supply to 40 countries of 91 drugs developed by 
28 Japanese firms in 2007.  
Previous literature on international strategic alliances is relevant to this paper. Because of 
recent increases in the numbers of international alliances, several studies such as Chen (2003), 
Chen, Ishikawa, and Yu (2004), Qiu (2006), and Ishikawa, Morita, and Mukunoki (2008) 
have examined cases in which manufacturers horizontally competing with each other enter foreign 
markets using rivals’ distribution channels. This horizontal structure, which is different from the 
vertical structure where manufacturers and retailers are vertically separated, raises important issues 
in the relationship between entry mode and distribution strategies in the product market. However, 
the literature on international horizontal alliances, or what we call marketing alliances, is, to our 
knowledge, limited to theoretical works. Many empirical studies on international alliances deal 
with technology-oriented alliances and analyze the determinants of the alliances (for example, 
Fosfuri, 2004). Because the focus of this paper is on the choice between marketing alliances and 
nonalliance supply strategies, which has not been extensively studied in the literature, our study 
contributes to the international strategic alliance literature.  
Because we address the choice of distribution channel into foreign markets, our study is 
related to those on foreign market entry mode choice. In the international trade literature, the 
determinants of the choice between export, licensing, and direct investment have been analyzed 
(Ethier and Markusen, 1996). In particular, because we regard marketing licensing, comarketing, 
or copromoting agreements as alliances, our study is closely related to the international licensing 
literature. HorstMar87 examine the foreign market entry mode choice between licensing and direct 
investment. This paper applies the framework of Horstmann and Markusen (1987) to consider a 
similar distribution channel choice: alliance versus direct launch. In the pharmaceutical market, 
Cross-Border Alliances for Local Market Entry in Pharmaceuticals
18
even if there are affiliates in local markets, drugs can be supplied through alliances. Therefore, the 
choice between an alliance and direct launch is appropriate. In previous empirical studies on 
international licensing, the international licensing pattern has been investigated using country-level 
aggregated data on royalty payments (Smith, 2001; Yang and Maskus, 2001). This paper 
studies the problem of firms’ alliance choices for each product in each market. Thus, as in 
McCalman (2004), our approach approximates a model illustrating firm behavior. Therefore, our 
contribution to the licensing literature is to show the relationship between the firms’ choice on an 
alliance and firm-, drug-, and market-specific characteristics, such as product portfolio, drug 
profitability, and intellectual property protection (IPP).  
Various (firm, drug, and market) characteristics are incorporated because these 
heterogeneities play a central role in determining foreign entry strategy. The trade literature 
focuses on the role of firm heterogeneity in the decision to serve foreign markets: exporting and 
investing abroad were studied by Melitz (2003) and Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004), 
respectively. However, unlike these and technological alliances, marketing alliances have not been 
extensively empirically examined. In addition to firm heterogeneity, because there are studies 
examining the relationship between trade and product quality (Schott, 2004; Hummels and 
Klenow, 2005), characteristics other than firm heterogeneity, such as product and market 
heterogeneity, have become important focuses. Our empirical specification considers firms’ entry 
choices to be no entry, direct launch, and alliances, and we investigate three types of determinants: 
firm-specific, drug-specific, and market-specific factors.  
From our estimations, we identify the determinants of international strategic alliances. We 
show the effects of firm characteristics on entry channel: large product portfolios discourage 
alliances but encourage direct launches. As Kyle (2006, 2007) stated, while licensed-out 
products may cannibalize sales of their own products, such effects are not severe for firms with 
small product portfolios. Thus, when such risks are low, alliances are likely to occur. This reveals 
the importance of considering multiproduct firms’ strategies to examine entry modes, while many 
trade models use a single-product firm framework. Our firm portfolio variable, which is the 
number of drugs, may also be a proxy for scope economies, because firms with scope economies 
can maintain a large number of research projects. This implies that scope economies affect direct 
launches positively. We also find positive effects of scale economies on direct launches. As 
Henderson and Cockburn (1996) show, scope economies and research productivity are 
positively related and scale economies are considered to be related to manufacturing productivity, 
which implies that if firms are productive in research and manufacturing, those firms are capable 
of running their own distribution. The trade literature focuses on the relationship between foreign 
entry mode and productivity. For example, Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) show that most 
productive firms invest abroad. Our results provide additional findings about the relationship 
between firm characteristics and foreign entry strategy. Productive firms tend to launch directly.  
Because we consider entry mode pattern in each market and product, variations in our data 
can help to identify the kinds of determinants, in addition to firm heterogeneity, that are significant 
for market entry strategy. The positive determinant of alliances is the strength of IPP, which is 
consistent with studies showing that trade and IPP are positively related (Smith, 2001; Yang and 
Maskus, 2001). Furthermore, our results indicate that moderate IPP encourages alliances most 
strongly, which McCalman (2004) found by using Hollywood film studio data. The likelihood of 
alliance behavior is nonmonotonic with respect to IPP in intellectual property intensive industries: 
IPP that is too weak or too strong may discourage alliances. As long as IPP is moderate, the risk of 
imitation is sufficiently low and thus alliances are chosen. On the other hand, in a stronger IPP 
country, alliances are unlikely to occur. For product characteristics, the positive determinant of 
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direct launch is the size of the world market for the drug that can be a proxy for drug quality in 
terms of profitability. Previous literature shows that high-income countries export high-quality 
goods (Schott, 2004; Hummels and Klenow, 2005). Our result implies that high- rather than 
low-quality goods are supplied through direct launches. We can consider that when the 
productivity of originator firms, protection of intellectual property rights, and quality of drugs are 
high, the contribution of the originator firm to raising profits is high. Thus, local marketing 
activities tend to be internalized when the originator firm’s position is important, which is 
consistent with the residual rights theory (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990).  
Our results also provide findings consistent with the theories of the licensing literature: 
innovations capturing large markets are more likely to be supplied by the originators (Katz and 
Shapiro, 1985), and products with less uncertain sales volumes are likely to be licensed (Rockett, 
1990). Although our conceptual and empirical frameworks are not directly based on these 
licensing models, our study provides additional empirical insights into the determinants of 
licensing transactions.  
As we mentioned, this study considers marketing licensing as an alliance. With respect to 
marketing or sales strategies, the role of local distribution sectors has been investigated in the trade 
literature (for example, by Richardson, 2004). However, this paper does not deal with structures 
where manufacturers and retailers are vertically separated. Rather, it focuses on cases where 
manufacturers use a rival’s distribution channel or brand name to enter the market. In this sense, 
our study differs from the retail contract literature (see, for example, Lafontaine and Slade, 
1997). Therefore, our empirical findings are complementary to those of the empirical studies of 
franchise.  
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the data set, and in Section 3, 
we demonstrate firm behavior in the choice between direct launches and marketing alliances and 
specify our empirical framework. Then we report our estimation results and discuss the 
implications in Section 4. The final section concludes.  
 
 
2  Data 
 
The data source we use in this study is Pharmaprojects by Informa. This data source includes 
about 40,000 drug data developed worldwide. The data are recorded by the following categories: 
drugs, companies, and therapies. The data file contains detailed information on drugs. Hence, we 
can ascertain, for example, the originator, whether the drug is licensed and country where the drug 
has been launched. Pharmaprojects uses the therapy classification code of the European 
Pharmaceutical Market Research Association, which has 17 broad and 218 narrow classifications. 
For example, one broad classification is “A: Alimentary/Metabolic products” and “A1A: 
stomatological” is a narrow class. In addition, the data include the current status of drugs in 40 
countries in 2007. Examples are “pre-clinical”, “phase I”, “launched”, and “suspended.” The status 
we focus on in this paper is “launched”, because our focus is on market entry strategies, not on 
technological development strategies. In the previous literature, Kyle 
(2006, 2007) use Pharmaprojects data to analyze the determinants of drug launches and examine 
the effect of price regulations and firm-specific characteristics.  
This paper uses data from Japanese pharmaceutical companies. We selected the firms that 
launched new drugs on a market between 1997 and 2007. We then identify the market in which a 
drug has been launched and the therapy for which it is intended. Hence, we constructed a 
drug–country pair and considered each pair as a unit of the sample. Our source of financial data is 
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the Japan Company Handbook 2007, published by Toyo Keizai. This data publication also 
contains R&D expenditures, which are considered less noisy than accounting for R&D input data 
(for example, Branstetter (2006) uses this data source). After omitting firms without R&D data 
from the sample, 28 sample firms with 91 launched drugs remained. Thus, the number of units in 
the sample is 91 drugs u  40 countries = 3640. The sample drugs fall into 48 therapeutic classes 
according to narrow classification.  
To ascertain whether a particular drug is supplied through a marketing alliance in a particular 
country, we checked the data file on each drug. As mentioned previously, the file contains 
information on the status of drugs. If the data file reports that the drug is supplied by companies 
other than the originator firm in a country where the drug’s status is “launched”, we consider it 
launched by a marketing alliance. In addition, if a comarketing or copromotion agreement is 
recorded, we also regard this as a marketing alliance. If the drug is licensed for worldwide 
marketing, we consider it launched by an alliance. An exception is in markets where there is a 
special note such as “excluding ASEAN countries.” Because we use the updated data file from 
2007, we may consider a case a marketing alliance when licensing occurred at a clinical stage 
before 2007, the firms passed clinical trials, and then sold the drug jointly in 2007. Therefore, our 
sample data may include a broader class of alliance. We also treat an entry mode as an alliance 
when firms not only launch a drug on their own, but also form alliances to supply the same drug in 
the market, a practice which is called second sourcing (for example, see Choi and Davidson, 
2004).  
On the other hand, we consider a direct launch as one where the drug is launched but there is 
no mention of an alliance in the data file. Thus, direct launch means that the originator firm neither 
collaborates with other firms’ marketing efforts, nor uses other firms’ brand names. In other words, 
marketing and branding activities are internalized by the originator firm. This construction of the 
direct launch variable may make the likelihood of direct launches in our analysis a conservative 
assessment. We cannot distinguish the case in which the originator uses its own distribution 
network and that in which it supplies its drugs through an independent wholesaler or retailer. 
Hence, we consider both cases as direct launches, because the brand name is the originator firm’s 
name and partner firms’ marketing activities are not involved. There might be bias in the sample 
when the publisher does not report an alliance agreement, even though one exists.  
We use variables associated with markets and drugs to control for these characteristics. Table 
1 reports summary statistics. The market variables are population, GDP (from the World 
Development Indicators Database), an IPP measure (from Park and Wagh, 2002), the number of 
drugs in the same class in a country (“Same Class in a Country”), and the number of local 
pharmaceutical firms (“Local Firms”). IPP measure is an index of each country’s strength of IPP, 
which ranges from 0 (lowest protection) to 5 (highest protection). The average score of sample 
countries is 3.69. As in the previous literature on the relationship between IPP and cross-border 
transactions, this variable is a key factor in investigating whether strong IPP affects firm entry 
mode. The number of drugs in the same therapy class in a country indicates the characteristics of 
local patterns of health and disease and the local regulatory regime. The presence of many drugs 
may reflect local demand patterns for particular diseases. The Local Firms variable is the number 
of pharmaceutical companies in a country, which may reflect imitation opportunities and local 
competition. On average, there are 12.7 pharmaceutical firms in each country.  
With respect to drug characteristics, “World Competitors” is the number of companies 
producing drugs in the same therapy class anywhere in the world. Thus, these data do not show 
variation across firms, but rather across drugs. It shows potential competitive pressure globally. 
With respect to firm characteristics, “Drugs Each Firm” is the number of drugs with which a firm  
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== Table 1 Here == 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
is associated (including developing, licensing, launching, and even suspended), indicating the 
product portfolio or scope economies of firms. The number of drugs can be a proxy for firm 
portfolio size, as Kyle (2006, 2007) suggests. Firms with large portfolios tend not to license out 
their products, because licensed-out products compete with other products of their own. This 
variable may also be a proxy for scope economies, because firms with scope economies can run 
multiple research projects to develop a large number of drugs. On the other hand, “Drugs Active” 
is the number of active drugs of each firm, where active drugs mean drugs under development or 
expected to be launched on a market. Thus, drugs that are currently supplied in markets but not 
scheduled to be launched in new markets are not considered active. Because there are two firms 
that did not have active drugs in 2007, the minimum value is 0. Although we use Drugs Each Firm 
for the analysis, the correlation between Drugs Each Firm and Drugs Active is high at 0.883.  
Our empirical analysis examines the firm entry pattern in each market. Figure 1 shows the 
number of alliances by our sample firms in each market. Because many drugs are supplied through 
alliances in several countries, the number of alliances is larger than that of drugs in our sample. 
While we can see that the number of alliances is large in Germany, Japan, Korea, and the US, 
alliances occur all over the world. In addition to the characteristics considered above, it is 
interesting to take partner firms’ characteristics into account. However, it is difficult to collect data 
on local partner firm characteristics. Moreover, because such data vary only over alliances, it is not 
possible to use these data to examine the choice between alliances and direct launches. Therefore, 
we explore market-, product-, and originator-specific data variations in this study.  
 
 
3  Model 
 
In this section, we introduce a simple conceptual framework for alliances and establish the 
empirical specifications.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
== Figure 1 Here == 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1  Marketing Alliance 
This study treats each drug–country pair as a sample unit and examines the firm strategies of each 
local market entry. There are basically three choices for originator firms: no launch, direct launch, 
and an alliance. The choice problem is formulated as the choice among these three alternatives. 
Because we do not consider technology licensing, but consider alliances including distribution 
activities such as promotion and marketing, we apply a simplified version of the Horstmann and 
Markusen (1987) framework, in which the choice between direct investment and licensing to 
enter a foreign market is examined.  
Consider the case in which an originator firm (licensor) has a new drug and seeks to launch it 
in a market. The available channels for a firm to enter the market are either launching it 
independently (direct launch) or finding a partner firm (licensee) to form an alliance to sell the 
drug. Assume that when firms negotiate an alliance, the originator firm that owns the intellectual 
property has all the bargaining power and makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Therefore, we consider 
the decision to form an alliance to be made by the originator.  
The payoffs of each entry mode are as follows. When the originator decides to launch directly, 
the per-period profit is expressed by S . On the other hand, when an alliance occurs, if the 
licensing fee is S , the profit for the partner firm is A SS  , where AS  is gross profit. We 
consider that this licensing fee is paid per period, so if the contract continues, the partner firm pays 
S  in each period. We assume that if the partner firm’s assets (e.g., local marketing and brand 
names) are more important than the originator firm’s in raising profits, then AS S  holds. On 
the other hand, if the originator firm’s assets (e.g., drug quality) are more important, AS S!  
holds.  
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Figure 1: The number of drugs supplied by alliances among sample firms in each country
Because alliances and licensing agreements do not perfectly cover intellectual property rights, 
we assume that a partner firm can produce an imitation product at low cost. If the partner firm 
does so, the partner firm’s profit is C SS  , where A CS S . However, in this case we assume 
that the alliance is terminated in the next period and the partner firm will obtain zero profit 
thereafter because of the inaccessibility of the intellectual property. If the partner firm does not 
produce an imitation good, the alliance contract continues forever. Therefore, the incentive 
compatible condition for the partner to remain in the alliance is:  
1
C AS S
r r
S S d    
where r  is the discount rate.  
In equilibrium, if the direct launch profit S  is sufficiently low, an alliance occurs. The 
equilibrium licensing fee is (1 ) A CS r rS S     from Inequality (1). In this case, the originator 
firm obtains S  . Therefore, the choice among no launch, direct launch, and an alliance depends 
on the following relationship: if and0SS !   direct launch is chosen, if and0S S !   an 
alliance is chosen, and if 0 andSS !   no launch is chosen. Note that if the originator firm’s 
assets are more important than the partner firm’s, i.e., AS S! , then S S   holds.  
The payoff from each choice is a function of the revenues and costs from the local market. 
Therefore, the factors affecting profits have an impact on the choice of mode. In the empirical 
specification section, we consider several factors of each company-, product-, and market-specific 
characteristic affecting entry mode choice. Here we present typical empirical hypotheses 
associated with company, drug, and country characteristics. The first hypothesis is related to 
company characteristics.  
 
Hypothesis 1. If a firm has a large product portfolio, the likelihood of an alliance is low and that 
of a direct launch is high.  
 
I f  f i rms with large portfol ios l icense out  their  products,  the r isk that  these  
products cannibalize own products is high. That is, the net profits from alliance is  
(forgone profits because of cannibalization)S  . The magnitude of cannibalized profits is large 
for large portfolio firms, thus (forgone profits because of cannibalization)S   is low. Hence, 
the profits from launching the drug by itself (S ) are likely to exceed those from an alliance. This 
hypothesis deals with the perspectives inherent in multiproduct firms. The validity of this 
hypothesis sheds light on the importance of involving a multiproduct firm to examine entry 
strategies. This firm characteristic is also related to productivity and is a central issue in examining 
the link between productivity and entry modes. The second hypothesis is related to drug 
characteristics.  
 
Hypothesis 2. If a drug can capture a large market, a direct launch tends to be chosen.  
 
If a drug can capture a large market, it means that drug quality in terms of profitability is high. 
Therefore, the originator firm’s asset is important. Then the profits from a direct launch (S ) are 
greater than those of the partner firm ( AS ). In this case, a direct launch is chosen. This is 
consistent with the residual rights theory view that residual rights should be allocated to the party 
whose assets are most important (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990). For 
multiproduct firms, entry patterns may differ across products. However, this type of hypothesis has 
not been examined empirically because of data limitations; firm-level data do not usually contains 
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(1)
product-level data. In this study, data on both firm-specific and product-specific factors are 
available, so the product-specific effect can be identified separately. Finally, the third hypothesis is 
related to country characteristics.  
 
Hypothesis 3. If IPP is severe, an alliance is likely to be chosen. In addition, moderate IPP most 
strongly encourages alliances.  
 
The positive IPP effect on the probability of an alliance exists because the imitation cost of the 
partner firm is high; therefore, the partner has lower profits (low CS ) and thus has less incentive 
to imitate. This makes S   large, so an alliance tends to be chosen. Moreover, the relationship 
between IPP and alliances can be nonlinear, as McCalman (2004) considered. This means that as 
long as IPP is moderately strong, the risk of imitation is sufficiently low and alliances are chosen. 
However, it is possible that alliances are less likely to be chosen when IPP is stronger. As 
discussed by McCalman (2004), in strong IPP countries, the originator firm’s contribution to 
raising revenues is high, because the innovations are highly protected. Because residual rights 
should be allocated to a party that contributes most to the value of a relationship, it is less crucial 
to provide residual rights to local firms that conduct marketing alliance-specific investment. This 
corresponds to the case that direct launch profits (S ) are greater than the partner firm’s profits 
under an alliance ( AS ). In such a case, alliances are unlikely to be chosen in stronger IPP 
countries, because alliances allocate more residual rights to the partner firm than direct launches 
do. The empirical model takes this aspect into account with the quadratic term of the IPP measure. 
Below, we introduce other factors affecting these alliance and direct launch choices.  
 
3.2  Empirical Specification 
To estimate the probability of the firm choosing an alliance, we specify the payoffs in the linear 
form as follows:  
a
a
d
d
S X e
X e
E
S E
  
  
 
where X  represents the factors affecting the payoffs, aE  and dE  are the coefficients specific 
to each choice, ae  and de  are error terms, and a  corresponds to an alliance and d  to a direct  
launch. By assuming that the distribution of error terms is an extreme distribution, we can express 
the choice probability in multinomial logit form:  
( ) exp( ) exp( )m m
m
Pr m X X m m n a dE E c
c
c       ¦  
where m  shows choice and n  corresponds to no launch. The coefficients depict the relative 
effect from the base choice: no launch.  
The estimation specification of m XE  for firm k , drug i , and country c  is:  
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10 11
2
12 13 14 15
Distance Subsidiary Portfolio Scale Econ R&DINT
Size Drug Age World Market Size World Comp Pop GDP
Other Class Drugs IPP IPP Loca
m m m m m m m
kic c k k k k
m m m m m m
k i i i c c
m m m m
ic c c
XE E E E E E E
E E E E E E
E E E E
     
     
    l Firms mc ic mW eJ  
 
We use the variables associated with company, drug, and country characteristics. The covariates 
considered in the international trade literature are also included. Table 2 shows the list of 
covariates and the predicted signs.  
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We use distance to control for trade and management costs, a decision inspired by gravity 
models (see for example, Disdier and Head, 2008). This will have a negative effect on both 
direct launches and alliances. The distance is the Great Circle distance between capital cities. The 
index of the presence of a foreign subsidiary is used to control for the effect of local base on not 
only direct launches but also alliances. This is because the presence of a local subsidiary may 
affect the bargaining process of alliances; therefore, it may raise direct launch profit, S , and 
licensing fee, S  . It is expected to affect both direct launches and alliances positively. This index 
takes the value of 1 if there are foreign affiliates in a country and 0 otherwise.  
Portfolio is the number of drugs the firm has been associated with. As described in 
Hypothesis 1, we are able to identify whether product portfolio affects entry mode choice. We also 
incorporate Scale Econ to capture scale economies by using total sales. These economies make 
their own costs low and profits (S ) high, implying a positive effect on direct launch. In the 
pharmaceutical industry, R&D is considered a major source of competitive edge. The variable 
R&DINT is R&D intensity of a firm, which enables us to examine the effect of innovation on 
entry mode. R&D intensity may increase profits (S ), thus implying a positive effect on direct 
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Table 2: Variables and Predictions
launches. However, the effect on alliances is ambiguous. We used the number of employees to 
control for firm size. Firm size may have a positive or negative impact on entry mode choice. As 
Fosfuri (2004) has shown, large firms are unlikely to sign licensing contracts, because they tend 
to have a distribution sector. On the other hand, as Gallini (1984) and Kim (2004) have shown, 
large firms may use alliances to keep a dominant position in a market, or large firms can form 
alliances. This is because they are not threatened by alliances, due to their dominant position. Note 
that several chemical and food companies have large numbers of employees, so we include a 
chemical and food firm dummy to take those firm characteristics into account.  
For drug characteristics, Drug Age is the year since a drug was first launched, which controls 
for the market perception of drugs. The greater Drug Age is, the less uncertainty there is in drug 
sales. Therefore, because the profits rise, Drug Age will have positive impact on both direct launch 
and alliance. World Market Size, as mentioned in Hypothesis 2, is the index of total world sales 
estimated by Informa taking a value from 1 (minimum) to 5 (maximum), which controls for the 
market potential of each drug. This is a proxy for drug quality in terms of profitability. World 
Comp represents the number of pharmaceutical firms in the world that produce drugs in the same 
broad therapy class. To control for endogeneity of the number of competitors, we exclude the 
number of companies that produce drugs in the same narrow therapy class from the number of 
firms producing the same broad class. That is, we use the number of firms producing different 
narrow but same broad therapy class drugs, except for cases where such data are not available. 
This is considered competitive pressure in the world market, therefore decreasing profits has a 
negative effect on entry predictions. Because alliances can be used to mitigate competitive 
pressure, the sign for alliance is ambiguous.  
Pop is the population and GDP is per-capita gross domestic product. These variables capture 
a country’s general characteristics on the demand side. Firms are likely to enter large markets. 
Other Class Drug is the number of drugs in other therapy classes in each country. This can be a 
proxy for local patterns of health and disease and local regulations. A particular health and disease 
pattern may create demand for drugs, and regulatory regimes affect the availability of drugs in 
each country. As Kyle (2007) shows, a country’s adoption of a price control policy affects entry 
decision significantly. Because in those data there is a correlation between the price control index 
and other country-specific variables, and data on price control are not available for all 40 countries, 
including price control creates a multicollinearity problem and a reduction in sample size. A 
similar problem occurs with country dummies. Therefore, we include region dummies instead to 
consider market-specific effects common within each region. It emerges that, because it is difficult 
to create a proper measure of regulations, we consider Other Class Drug a control for these 
country-specific health and regulatory effects. Using the number of drugs in the same therapy class 
may create an endogeneity problem; therefore, we use the number of other therapy class drugs in 
the estimations. Because this is merely a control variable, we do not assign a particular 
interpretation to the results.  
We also examine IPP, as described in Hypothesis 3, and local market imitation opportunities. 
IPP is the IPP measure developed by Park and Wagh (2002). IPP is expected to have a positive 
effect on alliances. To consider the nonlinear relationship between IPP and cross-border 
transactions, the quadratic term for IPP is used and is expected to have negative coefficient for 
alliances. Local Firms is the number of local pharmaceutical firms. This may show imitation 
opportunities in a local market. Imitation opportunities discourage alliances. This variable may 
also capture local competitive pressure and entry barriers in local markets. As we mentioned above, 
because we do not use regulation measures directly in the estimations, the significance of this 
variable and Other Class Drug is important. Finally, the variables in W  are dummies. We use a 
Kazutaka Takechi
27
Japan dummy to control for Japanese market-specific effects and region dummies (North America, 
South America, Europe) to control for market-specific effects common within each region; we use 
broad class therapy dummies to control for therapy-specific effects. Because of the 
multicollinearity problem, we do not use all therapy dummies.  
 
 
4  Estimation Results 
 
In this section, we report our estimation results and discuss the implications for company strategies 
and market supply patterns. Table 3 reports the results of multinomial logit estimation of entry 
mode choice. The odd numbered columns—1, 3, 4, and 7—show the choice of direct launch, and 
the even numbered columns—2, 4, 6, and 8—show the choice of alliance. While the sample size is 
3640, it is 3185 when we use the IPP measures (columns 5, 6, 7, and 8) because of data 
availability.  
We first discuss the coefficients of distance and subsidiaries. In all estimations, distance has a 
negative effect on both direct launches and alliances. On the other hand, the presence of a foreign 
subsidiary has a positive effect on these. The results for distance indicate that it can be a proxy of 
trade and management costs, and therefore discourages cross-border activities. This implication is 
related to those of gravity models. One thing to note is that among 40 sample countries, the 
countries far from Japan where few drugs are launched are in South America. Because our 
estimation includes region dummies, we obtain a negative effect for distance after controlling for 
South American country effects. The result that presence of a subsidiary positively affects the 
probability of direct launches implies that a local base is important for distributing products locally. 
The impact of a local subsidiary on alliances is also significantly positive. This result supports the 
theoretical result by Qiu06 that alliances and direct investment are complementary.  
The first two columns report the results of direct launches and alliances when we use only 
company characteristics in the estimation. Portfolio size positively affects direct launches, while it 
has a negative effect on alliances. Therefore, firms with a large portfolio have more incentive to 
launch directly and less incentive to form alliances when conducting business in new markets. 
This is consistent with Hypothesis 1 and Kyle (2006, 2007)’s argument, that firms with a large 
portfolio are unlikely to engage in licensing activities, because those products may cannibalize 
sales of their own products. This reveals the importance of dealing with multiproduct firms’ 
strategies to investigate entry mode choice. As mentioned above, our firms’ portfolio variable, 
which is the number of drugs that firms are associated with, may also be a proxy for scope 
economies. The estimation results suggest that firms with scope economies prefer direct launches. 
Our estimation results also show that scale economies are positively related to direct launches but 
have no relation to alliances. As scope economies are related to research productivity (Henderson 
and Cockburn, 1996) and scale economies to manufacturing productivity, this implies that firms 
with scope and scale economies are capable of engaging not only in research but also distribution 
activities. Therefore, as in the literature showing that productive firms self-select to export or FDI, 
here productive firms self-select to launch directly and not to form alliance. Heterogeneous firms 
use different foreign entry modes.  
Firm size has a negative impact on direct launches and a positive impact on alliances; a 
positive effect on alliances has also been found by Nagaoka and Kwon (2006) in a context of 
cross-licensing. Our results are consistent with the view that large firms tend to form alliances to 
manipulate market competition and their dominant positions are not threatened by alliances in a 
market. The results also suggest that large firm size does not necessarily entail the ability to  
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conduct distribution activities. Note that because we include a chemical and food firm dummy, this 
result is not caused by the presence of large chemical and food firms, but common characteristics 
of companies supplying drugs. Technological elements are also important factors for entry. R&D 
intensity is positively correlated with both direct launches and alliances. This implies that 
irrespective of entry modes, research-intensive firms tend to launch drugs. This reflects the 
importance of research activities in the pharmaceutical industry.  
Columns 3 and 4 report the results for drug characteristics. Drug characteristics are also 
significant determinants to entry mode choice. Drug age is positively related to both direct 
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Table 3: Multinomial Logit Estimation
Note: The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The letters a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and
10 percent levels. All estimations include therapy dummies, regional dummies, and a Japan dummy. *: These two columns
report marginal effects.
launches and alliances. When comparing the marginal effects reported in columns 7 and 8, the 
marginal effect on alliances is larger than that on direct launches. This can be attributed to less 
uncertainty about revenues of old drugs compared with those of new drugs, so it may be easy to 
reach a licensing agreement for older drugs (Rockett, 1990). In addition, because the patents of 
older drugs may expire in the near future, opportunity costs of alliances are low. This also makes 
alliance agreements easy to reach.  
The world market size for a drug is positively related to direct launches. This implies that 
profits from promising drugs with large markets are large, so the benefit from directly launching 
high-quality drugs is larger than those from an alliance. This is consistent with Hypothesis 2 and 
the theoretical result of Katz and Shapiro (1985) that major innovations that can capture a large 
market are less likely to be licensed. This result also adds insight into the relationship between 
quality and trade (Schott, 2004; Hummels and Klenow, 2005). Firms are likely to supply high- 
quality goods through their own channels. Then, with firm characteristics, our estimation reveals 
the determinants of marketing and branding strategies. Marketing and branding activities are likely 
to be internalized as the originator firms’ productivity and product quality are high, because their 
productivity and product quality affect revenues to a large extent. This is consistent with the 
residual rights theory view (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990) that residual 
rights should be allocated to the party contributing most to the value of the relationship, and direct 
launches allocate the rights to the originator firm. The effect of world competition is found to be 
negative for both direct launches and alliances. While these effects are insignificant, the negative 
effect on both direct launches and alliances may imply that if there are a large number of potential 
competitors, neither entry mode is likely to occur. This suggests the possibility that competitive 
pressure does not change firms’ entry alternative strategies but suppresses the incentive to enter 
new markets.  
Columns 5 and 6 report the results when we include market characteristics. The size of 
population and GDP affect direct launch positively but insignificantly. The effect of the number of 
drugs for other therapies (Other Class Drug) is positive for both choices. A local pattern of health 
and disease represents a particular demand for drugs. In addition, regulations may affect the 
availability of drugs. Because the number of drugs for other therapies is significant for both entry 
modes, we are to some extent able to control for the local determinants of demand side and the 
regulations for pharmaceutical entry mode.  
Finally, we discuss the variables associated with IPP. Columns 5 and 6 show the effects of 
IPP. IPP is positively related to alliances, while it has no significant effect on direct launches. This 
is consistent with Hypothesis 3 and the findings of international transaction flows that IPP is 
positively correlated with licensing royalties (Smith, 2001; Yang and Maskus, 2001). IPP may 
be associated with strong enforcement of alliance contracts, encouraging alliance agreements. 
Moreover, we found that the quadratic term for IPP is negative, suggesting that moderate IPP most 
strongly encourages alliances. This finding is consistent with McCalman04 using movie company 
data. Because both the pharmaceutical and movie industries are intellectual property intensive, 
firm strategies with regard to IPP may be similar. As long as IPP is moderately strong, the risk of 
imitation is rather low, so the likelihood of alliance is high. However, in a stronger IPP market, 
consistent with theories on residual rights allocation (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and 
Moore, 1990), alliances are unlikely to be chosen. Alliances allocate more residual rights to the 
partner firm than do direct launches. Thus, in a stronger IPP country, residual rights should be 
allocated to the originator firm, because its intellectual property is highly protected and thus 
contributes most to the value of a relationship.  
The number of local firms is negatively correlated with direct launches. Hence, firms do not 
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tend to enter by themselves when there are imitation opportunities and competition from local 
pharmaceutical firms. Because it is not significantly related to alliances, the possibility of imitation 
and competition may not imply a change of mode choice from direct launches to alliances. In a 
high imitation and competition country, firms simply may have less incentive to launch in any 
form. Because we do not directly use regulation measures in the estimations, the significance of 
local firms suggests that this variable may capture local market conditions, as for Other Class 
Drug.  
Columns 7 and 8 report marginal effects, because the estimated coefficients  
a n d  m a r g i n a l  e f f e c t s  d o  n o t  c o i n c i d e  i n  t h e  m u l t i n o m i a l  l o g i t  m o d e l s  
( ( ) ( )( ( ))m mk k kmPr m x Pr m Pr mE E cc cw  w  ¦ ). The results are qualitatively similar between the  
coefficients (columns 5 and 6) and the marginal effects. The marginal effects of distance and 
subsidiary do not substantially differ between direct launches and alliances. The effect of R&D 
intensity is larger for alliances than for direct launches. While the question of whether licensing 
opportunities decrease or increase an incentive for innovation is theoretically ambiguous (Katz 
and Shapiro, 1985), our result suggests that R&D is related to profitability from alliances more 
than direct launches. As mentioned above, the marginal effect of Drug Age is higher for alliances, 
implying that old drugs are more likely to be licensed.  
To assess the fit of our empirical model, we compared the predicted choices from our 
estimation and choices from the data. In Table 4, the choices in the data are shown in the rows and 
the predicted choices are in the columns. The figures in the diagonal of the table are the numbers 
for which the predicted choices are the same as the observed choices. Our model predicts the 
emergence of fewer alliances than the data indicate. This may reflect the number of alliances being 
overcounted in our data, as described in Section 2. However, overall, about 81 percent of choices 
are matched.  
 
 
 
 
== Table 4 here == 
 
 
 
 
 
While we focus on the mode choice of the distribution channels of pharmaceutical companies, 
the identification of determinants of entry is an important issue (Scott Morton, 1999; Danzon, 
Wang and Wang, 2005; Lanjouw, 2005; Kyle, 2006,2007). Table 5 reports the estimation 
results for choices of whether to enter. We employed probit and linear probability models. The 
results of these estimations are qualitatively similar to those in the previous estimations. For 
example, the effect of distance is negative and the presence of a subsidiary is positive. R&D 
intensive firms tend to launch drugs. These factors are significant not only for direct launches and 
alliances, but also for entry decisions.  
By combining the results of the entry mode choice obtained in Table 3 with those here, we 
can derive several implications. The effect of portfolio size is negative here, whereas portfolio size 
is significantly and positively associated with direct launches and negatively with alliances. The 
negative effect of entry is similar to the results by Kyle (2006, 2007). Our estimations show that 
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Table 4: Predictions
large portfolios facilitate direct launches but discourage alliances, and thus seem to have a 
negative effect on entry as a whole, which provides insights additional to those of Kyle (2006, 
2007)’s results. Similarly, scale economies have an insignificant effect on entry in the linear 
probability model estimations, while in the entry mode choice estimations, they have a positive 
effect on direct launches and are insignificant for alliances. This shows that considering entry 
alone may lead to the mistaken conclusion that scale economies are irrelevant. We must 
investigate entry modes in detail when considering the effects of these firm characteristics on drug 
launches.  
In summary, our estimations show that firm characteristics affect entry channel choice: large 
portfolio encourages direct launches but discourage alliances and scale economies are positively 
related to direct launches. We also show that market and product characteristics are important for 
entry mode choice. Positive effects of drug quality on direct launches are found and alliances are 
facilitated in countries with moderately strong IPP. When firms have small portfolios and IPP is 
moderately strong, the risk that licensed-out products and imitations will cannibalize sales of their 
own products is low. In such a case, alliances are likely to be chosen. On the other hand, if the 
productivity of firms and quality of product are high, the contribution of the originator firm to 
increasing profits is high. Then, local marketing and branding activities tend to be internalized 
because direct launches allocate residual rights to the originator firm that contributes most to the 
value of the relationship.  
 
 
5  Concluding Remarks 
 
This study has analyzed the pharmaceutical company strategies of local entry mode: the choice 
between direct launches and marketing alliances. We used data on Japanese pharmaceutical 
companies and investigated the determinants of their choices. Our estimations show that firm entry 
mode choices depend on drug-specific, firm-specific, and market-specific factors. Firm 
heterogeneity captured by product portfolio size and scale economies determine the differences in 
choice between alliances and direct launches. Thus, while many trade models use a single-product 
firm framework, it is important to consider multiproduct firm perspectives to study entry strategies. 
Drug quality captured by potential market size also affects entry mode choice, which has not been 
examined by studies of product quality patterns of exports. The empirical results are consistent 
with the residual rights theory, in which as the role of the originator firm becomes important, 
control rights are allocated to it. Finally, IPP is relevant to entry mode choices and it has a 
nonmonotonic relationship with the likelihood of alliances.  
The results obtained in this study suggest several implications for understanding strategic 
alliance behavior. However, there remain important factors that have not been explored in this 
paper. First, because of data limitations, partner firm characteristics are not taken into account. 
Dealing with the matching process between the originator and partner firms explicitly is useful to 
find pair characteristics inherent in alliance agreements. The rise of alliances may depend on a 
certain combination of characteristics. Second, as mentioned in the introduction, marketing 
alliances are likely to have an effect on market competition. To address this issue, focusing on a 
particular drug market and estimating the demand function of differentiated products are 
appropriate to investigate the effects of alliances on drug market competition. These issues require 
future research.  
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Table 5: Entry Decision
Note: The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The letters a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and
10 percent levels. All estimations include therapy dummies, regional dummies, and a Japan dummy.
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